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Abstract 
A planner is interested in designing an ex-post efficient, individually rational, Bayesian 
mechanism for allocating a single indivisible object to one of the agents who knows his 
own valuation and only the distribution of other agents' valuations of the object. In this 
paper, we show that it is impossible to design such a mechanism without any transfers 
among agents and the planner. However, we discover and describe an ex-post efficient, 
ex-post individually rational, Bayesian mechanism which balances transfers among agents 
without any payment to (or from) the planner. 
Our result that an ex-post efficient, ex-post individually rational, transfer balanced, 
Bayesian mechanism exists, is in stark contrast to two well-known impossibility results 
in the literature; the nonexistence of a Bayesian public good mechanism satisfying ex­
post efficiency, individual rationality and budget balance (Laffont and Maskin (1979)) 
and the impossibility of an ex-post efficient, individually rational, Bayesian bilateral 
trading mechanism between a seller and a buyer without an outside subsidy (Myerson 
and Satterthwaite (1983)). 
First Best Bayesian Privatization Mechanisms* 
Maciej K. Dudekt Taesung Kim+ John 0. Ledyard§
1 Introduction 
Consider a planner who is interested in allocating a single indivisible object (a "prize" ) to 
one of several agents in the economy. Each agent knows his own valuation for the object, 
but only knows the distribution of other agents' valuations. The planner's objective is to 
find an ex-post efficient mechanism. In other words, a mechanism which always assigns 
the object to the agent who values it most, while balancing the transfers among agents, 
so there is no payment (or subsidy) to (or from) the planner. The mechanism also has 
to be incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational. Each agent is guaranteed 
a nonnegative gain by participating in the mechanism. We call solutions to this problem 
first best privatization mechanisms. 
Two main types of questions regarding privatization mechanisms are examined in this 
paper. The first type is motivated by the fact that in many applications it is illegal or im­
possible to compensate agents who participate in the mechanism (see, e.g., Guler, Plott, 
and Vuong (1994)). We look at the extreme case where no transfers among agents are 
allowed. We ask whether the planner can design an ex-post efficient, Bayesian-incentive 
compatible mechanism for allocating the object without any transfers among agents. 
The answer is no (Theorem 1 in Section 3). Then we ask what mechanism gives the best 
performance among Bayesian-incentive compatible mechanisms without transfers. We 
answer this question by showing that no Bayesian-incentive compatible mechanism with­
out transfers caff'interimPareto dominate alottery mechanism. Moreover, we show that
*We are grateful to Kim Border, Leo Hurwicz, Mathew Jackson, Herve Moulin and Tom Palfrey for 
their comments on an early version. We have also benefitted greatly from the many valuable suggestions 
of two anonymous referees. 
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for any Bayesian-incentive compatible mechanism without transfers, there exists a lottery 
mechanism which weakly interim Pareto dominates this mechanism. (See Theorem 2 in 
Section 3) 
The second type question is concerned with mechanisms where transfers among the 
agents are allowed, but are required to be balanced (i.e. , outside payments to or from the 
planner are not allowed). Specifically, we ask: Can the planner design an individually­
rational, ex-post efficient, Bayesian-incentive compatible mechanism with balanced trans­
fers? The answer is yes. In answering this question we examine mechanisms satisfying the 
strongest form of individual rationality, namely ex-post individual rationality. Specifically, 
we present a Bayesian mechanism which implements ex-post efficient, ex-post individually­
rational allocations with balanced transfers (Theorem 3 in Section 4). Moreover, if every 
agent's valuation is drawn from the same distribution, our mechanism strictly interim 
Pareto dominates the simple equal chance lottery (Theorem 4 in Section 4). 
There are many works in the literature using the Bayesian approach to study mecha­
nism design. In the context of public goods economies, D' Aspremont and Gerard-Varet 
(1979) discovered a Bayesian mechanism that achieves ex-post efficiency and budget 
balance. However, the mechanism of D'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet is not interim indi­
vidually rational. Laffont and Maskin (1979) showed that, in general, ex-post efficiency 
and interim-individual rationality are incompatible in budget balanced, Bayesian public 
goods mechanisms. Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Ledyard and Palfrey (1994) and Rob 
(1989) respectively have shown that in large economies interim-individual rationality and 
incentive compatibility imply that the public good will never be produced. 
In the context of bilateral trading of a single, private indivisible object between one 
seller and one buyer, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) proved the impossibility of ex­
post efficient, interim-individually rational, Bayesian mechanisms without an outside 
subsidy. More recently, however, Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) showed that if in addi­
tion to a seller there are at least two potential buyers whose valuations are independently 
drawn from the same distribution, then for some distributions of valuations there exist 
ex-post efficient, interim-individually rational, Bayesian mechanisms for trading the ob­
ject. 
Considering the impossibility theorems predominant in the literature, our possibility 
results are rather surprising. Our possibility results rely on two main factors. First, our 
problem is to allocate a single private indivisible object rather than a public good as in 
Laffont and Maskin (1979). 
Second, and more importantly, in the bilateral trading literature (Myerson and Sat­
terthwaite (1983), Makowski and Mezzetti (1993)) the object is owned by one of the 
agents in the economy-namely the seller-but in our model it is owned by the plan­
ner. Our possibility result suggests that the property right, which makes the individual-
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rationality condition hard to satisfy in a bilateral trading model, is the main obstacle 
to achieving ex-post efficiency with a Bayesian mechanism. Our result is somewhat con­
sistent with another positive result of Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987), which 
shows that a partnership can be dissolved in an ex-post efficient, interim individually ra­
tional way if every agent's valuation is independently drawn from the same distribution 
and no partner has too large a share. However, in our model each agent's valuation does 
not have to be drawn from the same distribution and the problems considered are quite 
different. Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) also has a result related to ours. For the agents 
with uniformly-distributed valuations, they proved the existence of first-best, interim IR 
mechanisms. On the other hand, we present a specific first-best mechanism which works 
for the general class of distributions. Most importantly, our mechanism is ex-post IR 
while Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) and Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) only 
required interim IR. 
Although the standard in Bayesian mechanism design is interim-individual rationality, 
there are various reasons why we are interested in ex-post individually-rational mecha­
nisms. First, with ex-post IR, the mechanism can be operated without relying on external 
credit markets or outside subsidies which are needed in interim IR mechanisms to avoid 
the bankruptcy problem. Second, even if external credit markets or outside subsidies are 
available, in reality the designer often cannot prevent an agent from dropping out of the 
mechanism ex-post when the final outcome gives him negative utility. Third, most of the 
rules used by real world institutions, such as auctions, double auctions, bid-ask markets, 
etc., are ex-post individually rational. 
In the mechanism-design literature, Gresik (1991) and Sappington (1983) in a differ­
ent context use ex-post IR as one of the requirements of the mechanism. Gresik showed 
how to construct ex-post IR, ex-ante efficient, bilateral trading mechanisms from interim 
IR, ex-ante efficient mechanisms. Sappington showed that in a principal-agent model be­
tween risk-neutral parties, with an ex-post IR constraint, the first-best outcome cannot 
be achieved, although it can be with an interim IR constraint. In both cases, to achieve 
ex-post IR, one must sacrifice the ex-post efficiency. However, in our privatization mech­
anism we are able to achieve both ex-post IR and ex-post efficiency. 
In the complete information implementation context, where the agents' valuations of 
the object are common knowledge among agents, Glazer and Ma (1989) introduced multi­
stage mechanisms assigning the object to the agent with the highest valuation.without any 
transfer of money among agents at equilibrium. However, we show that with incomplete 
information any ex-post efficient, Bayesian mechanism must involve nonzero monetary 
transfers among agents at equilibrium (Theorem 1 in Section 3). Therefore, our results 
prove that Glazer and Ma's result does not hold in the case of incomplete information. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a formal model is given.
In Section 3 we discuss Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms without transfers. 
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Then, in Section 4 we present an ex-post efficient, ex-post individually rational, transfer 
balanced, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism. 
2 The Model 
Consider a problem where a planner allocates a single indivisible object (a "prize" ) to
one of n(;?:: 2) agents in the economy. Agent i's valuation, vi, of this object is known
only to agent i, but it is common knowledge that vi is an independent random variable 
with the distribution function Fi on [a, b], where [a, b] is the set of possible valuations of
agent i and 0 � a � b. Let fi be the probability density function corresponding to Fi 
(so fi =Ff) . We assume that each fi is positive on its domain [a, b]. Every agent in the
economy knows the value of the object to the planner, c (2:: 0). We assume that c = 0
since the results in this paper can be easily generalized to any positive c. (See Corollary
5.) 
These agents participate in the mechanism to determine who receives the object and 
how much money should be transferred between agents. In a direct mechanism all agents 
report their valuations simultaneously to the planner who then determines the recipient of 
the object and the amount of monetary transfers between the agents. Such a mechanism 
is described by outcome functions (p, x) on [a, bin, where
n 
p(v) = (P1(v),p2(v), . . .  ,pn(v)) with LPi(v) = 1, Pi(v);?:: 0, v = (v1, . . .  ,vn)i=l 
are the probabilities that the object will be given to the agent i and 
are the monetary transfers to agent i when agent i reports Vi· 
Let v_i = (v1, . . .  , Vi-I, Vi+i, . . .  , vn), and let E_i(·) be the expectation operator with
respect to V-i· The direct mechanism (p, x) is called Bayesian incentive compatible if
each type of each player wants to report truthfully when others report truthfully; for all 
i, 
where 
Ui(vi; vi) =  ViE-i(Pi(vi, V_i) )  + E_i(xi(vi, v_i) ) .
Ui( vi; vi) is the interim expected utility of agent i of type vi if i reports vi. By the
revelation principle (e.g., Gibbard (1973), Myerson (1979)), we do not lose any generality
by restricting our attention to Bayesian incentive compatible direct mechanisms, which 
we simply call Bayesian mechanisms from now on. 
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To guarantee that every agent participates in the mechanism, each agent has to be 
better off participating than not. In this paper we ask for the mechanism to be ex-post 
individually rational, i.e., Vi, Vv E [a, b],
That is, for any realization of valuations v each agent has to receive nonnegative utility
in the mechanism. Ex-post individual rationality obviously implies interim individual 
rationality. In an interim individually rational mechanism, some agents can be worse 
off ex-post for some realization of valuations v. Some agents may want to walk away
from the mechanism after the decision of the mechanism is revealed. However, if the 
mechanism is ex-post individually rational, no agent has an ex-post incentive to walk 
away from the mechanism. 
Ex-post efficiency requires that, for any realization of types, the object be given to 
the agent with the highest valuation. Thus, the mechanism is ex post efficient if 
{ 1 if vi > vk for all k =f. i Pi(v) = O if vi < vk for some k. 
In case more than one agent has the highest valuation, then the object can be given 
to any of them in the ex-post efficient mechanism. However, since this happens with 
probability zero, it is ignored in the above definition of ex-post efficiency. 
We introduce two different types of restrictions on the monetary transfers among 
agents and the planner. The mechanism is without transfers if Vv, Vi,
Xi(v) =O. 
The mechanism is called transfer balanced if Vv, 
n 
L:xi(v) = 0.i=l 
In a transfer-balanced mechanism, transfers are allowed between agents, but the plan­
ner cannot collect (or subsidize) any money from (or to) the set of agents. 
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3 The Impossibility of a First-Best Mechanism With­
out Transfers 
In this section two questions are addressed regarding mechanisms without transfers. 
The first question is: Can ex-post efficiency be achieved by some mechanism without 
any monetary transfers? This type of question was posed and answered positively in 
the complete information framework by Glazer and Ma (1989). However, if there is 
incomplete information, the answer is no. 
1 Theorem Let Gi(t) = IIkiiFk(t) . This is the probability that all vk other then vi
will be less than or equal to t. If there is some i such that Gi(vi) i= Gi(vi) for some
vi, vi E (a, b) , then there is no ex-post efficient Bayesian mechanism without transfers.
Proof: Suppose (p, x) is an ex-post efficient Bayesian mechanism without transfers. Then
Xj(v) = 0 for all j and all v. Also Pi(v) = 1 if vi >  Vk for all k i= i and Pi(v) = 0 if Vi < vk
for some k. Further, in order for (p, v) to be Bayesian incentive compatible, it must be
true that for all i Ui(v; ; vi) � Ui(v; , vi) for all v; , vi E [a, b]. Thus:
and 
So if there is, .. an ex-,p.ost . ..efficient.Bayesian. mechanis.m., . .then Jor .all -i .and all vi, v; >
0, Gi(vi) = Gi(vi) . But by hypothesis, there is an i with vi, v; > 0 such that Gi(vi) i= 
Gi(vi) . I 
The incomplete information assumption needed to get impossibility is truly minimal: 
only one i need be unsure whether one of two values yields a higher probability for 
wmnmg. 
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3.1 Remark In Theorem 1 above we showed that no ex-post efficient mechanism exists
without transfers. Since Glazer and Ma's multi-stage mechanism (1989) with complete
information is without transfers along the equilibrium path, but allows transfers of the 
equilibrium path, one wonders whether a mechanism without transfers only along the equi­
librium path can be designed even in the incomplete information framework. However, 
Theorem 1 suggests that the answer is no. To see this, suppose there is a mechanism, pos­
sibly an extensive form, whose outcome is ex-post efficient and which is transfer balanced 
along the equilibrium path. Then by the revelation principle there is a direct mechanism 
in which truth is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and transfers along the equilibrium are 
zero. The proof of Theorem 1 shows that it is impossible.
The second question is: What mechanism gives the best performance without trans­
fers? The answer is that any lottery is one of the best Bayesian mechanisms without 
transfers that planner can design. We prove this only for two agents since generalization 
to any number of agents is trivial. The mechanism is called a lottery mechanism if Vv1, v2, 
for some 0 :::; a :::; 1. Moreover, it is called the equal chance lottery mechanism if it is a
lottery mechanism with a = 1/2. A lottery mechanism is obviously Bayesian incentive
compatible and ex-post individually rational. Even though it is not ex-post efficient, it 
is one of the best in the following sense: 
2 Theorem i. No Bayesian mechanism (p, x ) without transfers can interim Pareto
dominate a lottery mechanism. 
ii. For any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism (p, x) without transfers, there exists
a lottery mechanism which weakly interim Pareto dominates (p, x) . 
Proof: i. For the mechanism (p, x) to satisfy Bayesian incentive compatibility for agent
1, Vv1, v1,
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Similarly, for agent 2, it follows that Vv2, 02, 
Therefore, 
V1 lb Pl ( V1, t2) f2 ( t2) dt2 
V1 lb (lbP1(vi,t2)f2(t2)dt2) fi(v1)dv1, 
and 
V2 lb P2(ti, V2)f1(t1) dt1 
V2 lb (lb P2(t1, V2)f1(t1) dt1) h( v2) dv2. 
If the mechanism (p, x) interim Pareto dominates the a lottery mechanism for some
a E [O, 1] at (v1, v2), then without loss of generality,
Then, 
lb lbP1(t1, t2)h(t2)f1(t1) dt1 #2 > a, and
lb lb P2(t1, t2)fi(t1)f2(t2) , dt1 , dt2 > 1 - a, 
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n. Let
and 
Since (p, x) is incentive compatible and without transfers, by the same argument in
the proof of i. ai( vi) is a constant number for all vi. So, let
Moreover, a1 + a2 = 1 since
1b a1(v1 )fi(v1 ) dv1 + 1b a2(v2 )h(v2 ) , dv1
1b 1b(P1(v1 ,v2 ) + p2(v1 ,v2 ) )fi(vi)f2(v2 ) ,dv1 ,dv2 .
The interim utility U1 ( v1 ; v1 ) for agent 1 under (p, x) is
V1 1b P1(v1 , v2 )h(v2) dv2
0!1 V1 . 
Therefore, for every agent the interim utility from (p, x) is the same as that from the
lottery mechanism with the winning probability a1 to the agent 1. I 
3.2 Remark A Bayesian mechanism with the property i in Theorem 2 is called interim
incentive efficient in Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). 
If transfers between agents are allowed but are required to be balanced, then as we 
show in the next section, not only ex-post efficiency but also ex-post individual rationality 
can be achieved via a Bayesian mechanism. Moreover, if the distribution of each agent's 
valuation is same (i.e., Fi = F for all i), then the mechanism we propose interim Pareto
dominates the equal chance lottery mechanism. 
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4 Ex-Post Individually Rational, First Best Mecha-
. n1sm 
In this section, we introduce a simple transfer balanced, Bayesian mechanism which 
implements ex-post efficient, ex-post individually rational allocations. Since we require 
transfer balance on the part of the planner, auction mechanisms, such as the second 
price auction in which the seller extracts money from the buyers, cannot be considered 
as candidates. However, we suggest the following simple mechanism. 
For the analysis of this section, we define the new distribution functions G, Gi, and 
Gij from Fi's as follows; for all t, 
n 
G(t) II Fk(t)
k=l 
Gi(t) II Fk(t); and
k-fi 
Gii(t) II Fk(t) .
kfi,j 
3 Theorem The mechanism defined by
p;(v) = { : if vi2:'.: vkVk and i=min{l� j �n: vi2:'.: vkVk}
otherwise 
Xi(v) 
_ 
L 
1vi J! G(s) ds fk(t) 
dt
_ n
-
1 
a 
k-fi a G(t) Fk(t) n
if vi 2: Vk Vk and i = min{ l � j � n: Vj 2: Vk Vk} 
is Bayesian incentive compatible, transfer balanced, ex-post efficient and ex-post individ­
ually rational. 
1 0  
4.1 Remark In the case that two or more agents report the highest valuation, the above
mechanism assigns the object to the agent with the lowest index among them. How ever, 
since ties occur with probability zero, they can be ignored in the analysis below. 
Proof: If agent i reports vi, then the probability that he gets the object is Gi(vi)· In this
event, agent i gets the transfer of
of 
_ L 1v; 
I: G ( s) ds . f k ( t) dt _ 
n - 1 a. 
k-:j:i a G(t) Fk(t) n 
If agent k reports the highest valuation vk, then agent i (i =/=- k) receives the transfer
1vk _I:_c_(s_) d_s. _fi(_t) dt +_!_a
a G(t) Fi(t) n · 
Note that Gik(vk) is the probability that every agent except agents i, k have valuation
lower than vk. Therefore,
(1) 
To show that this mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible, note that for all i, 
au,��.; v,) = G[( V;)
· 
("'•- �£' I! �i:� ds ·-;.iii dt- n : 1,,,) 
-Gi(vi). L 
I:i G\s) ds . fk(�i) - L Gik(vi) fk(vi). (1v; I: G(s) ds . fi(t) dt +.!..a) 
k#i G(vi) Fk(vi) k#i a G(t) Fi(t) n 
= L Gik(vi) fk(vi). (vi - L 1v; I
: G(s) ds. fk(t) dt 
- n - 1 a)
k-:/:i k#i a G(t) Fk(t) n 
1 1
by using integration by parts 
"" G ( A ) f ( A ) ( A ) • 1. 
J� G ( s) ds 1. G ( t) 0= � ik vi k vi · vi - vi smce im G( ) = im G ( ) = . t--->a t t--->a 1 tko/=i 
Notice also that 
aui(vi; vi) >0 if Vi < Vi,ovi 
aui(vi; vi) =0 if Vi =Vi,ovi 
aui( vi; vi) <0 if Vi >Vi. ovi 
So, Ui( vi; vi) is maximized if Vi = Vi, hence the mechanism is Bayesian incentive
compatible. 
By the definition of (p, x) , it is easy to see that the mechanism is ex-post efficient
and transfer balanced. Moreover, the mechanism is ex-post individually rational since 
the transfer to the loser is always nonnegative and 
'"""" 1v; J� G(s) ds fk(t) d n - 1 � --- ·-- t+ --a ko/=i a G(t) Fk(t) n 
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smce 
F-(s) 
_z_ < 1 V s <t Fi(t) - -
meaning that winner's net transfer is less than the his valuation of the object. I 
Example Consider the case where two agents' distributions are given by
on [O, 1] for some a, (J > 0. Then for this environment our mechanism in Theorem 3 
turns out to be 
P1(v) = c
otherwise 
X1 (u ) = { 
f3 v - a+f3+1 1 
a 
a+f3+l V2 
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otherwise 
A particularly interesting and simple example arises for the case of identical uniform 
distributions (a =  /3 = 1) . Here the agent with the highest value gets the item and pays
1/3 of his value to the other agent. If there are n agents, the highest valued agent with
value v pays n�l v to each of the other n - 1 agents. Thus, the winner gets n!i v and
the losers each get n�I v. Notice that everyone is better off than 0 (ex-post individually
rational) , transfers balance since
2 n - 1 
-- v+ -- v =v n+ l n+ l '
and the item goes to the highest value (first best allocation) . Finally, it is easy to show
that it is Bayesian incentive compatible. 
4.2 Remark Note that our mechanism may admit another Bayesian Nash equilibrium
with less desirable outcomes. However, Palfrey and Srivastava {1991) showed that for
independent types and private values any incentive efficient allocation can be uniquely 
implemented by an augmentation of a direct mechanism. 
4.3 Remark For the finite type case, the requirements of ex-post individual rationality
and Bayesian incentive compatibility with ex-post efficiency can be expressed simply as a
system of linear inequalities. Kim and Ledyard {1994) provided mechanisms for the finite
type case based on a Theorem of Alternative. 
In Section 3 we showed that among the class of mechanisms without transfers any
lottery mechanism is interim incentive efficient. Therefore, if each agent's valuation is 
drawn from the same distribution, i.e. , Fi = F for all i, the equal chance mechanism
seems to be a reasonable candidate without transfers. However, if we allow transfers 
among agents, we have the following result: 
4 Theorem If Fi, = F for all i and F is strictly increasing, then the mechanism
defined in Theorem 3 interim Pareto dominates the equal chance mechanism, i.e., V i,
V vi, 
Proof: Since Fi = F for all i, by (1)
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Let 
Then, 
Then, 
n-1 ( 1vi f!(F(s)r ds n -1 ) - (F(vi) ) · vi - (n -1) a (F(t) )n+l f(t) dt - -n- a 
1
b n-2 (1v J!(F(s)r , ds 1 ) +(n -1) v=v/F(v) )  f(v) · a (F(t) )n+l f(t) , dt +-:;;,a 
- H(v;) · ( v; - (n -1) r f���)��:�5f(t) dt - " n la) 
1b 
(1
v J!(F(s)r ds 1 ) 1 + v=vi 
h(v) · a (F(t) )n+l f(t) dt +-:;;,a dv - -:;;,vi.
Notice that 
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1 ,dv - - Vin 
l:i ( F ( s) r , ds - H( vi)· (1 -(n -1) (F( vi))n+l f( vi))
( 
rv; l:(F(s)r ds n -1 ) +h(vi) · Vi -(n -1) la (F(t))n+l f
(t) dt --
n
-a 
( 
rv ; l:(F(s)r ds 1 ) 1 -h(vi) · la (F(t))n+l J
(t) , dt +;,a -;, 
_ H( · ) _ � h( · ) . ( . _ l:i(F(s)r , ds _ 1v; l:(F(s)r , dsf( ) d _ ) Vi n + Vi Vi (F(vi))n n a (F(t))n+l t , t a 
- H( vi) - � by using the integration by parts.
n 
Choose v; satisfying H (vi) = �. Since Wi is a convex function,
for all vi. Moreover,
( *) 
( 
* ( ) r: l:(F(s))
n , ds () n-1) H vi · vi - n -1 la (F(t))n+l f 
t , dt --
n
-a 
l
b 
( 
[vi l: ( F ( s) r , ds 1 
) 
1 *+ 
v=vi h(v). la (F(t))n+l f
(t) ' dt +;,a ' dv - ;, Vi 
( *) 
( 
* ( ) [vi l: (F( s) r , ds ( ) n -1 ) - H vi · vi - n -1 la (F(t))n+l f t
, dt --
n
-a 
( 
r: l: ( F ( s) r ds 1 ) * 1 *+ la (F(t))n+l f
(t) dt +;,a · (1 - H(vi )) - ;, vi 
_ 
� : _ [vi l:(F(s)r , dsf· ( \.d . ·(- n -1 _ �) 
n 
vi la (F(t))n+l 
t; t 
n + 1 n 
-�a· (-n -1+1 -�) -� v*n n n n i 
- 0. 
Therefore, for all Vi 
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I 
The following Corollary shows that the assumption that the value of the object to 
the planner, c, is 0 is innocuous if the planner is only interested in collecting c from the
agents whenever the object is given to one of the agents. Notice that for c(2: 0) ,  ex-post
efficiency means that if any agent's valuation is higher than c, the one with the highest
valuation receives the object and that if every agent's valuation is lower than c, then the
planner keeps it. Also, in this context transfer balance requires that the planner collect 
exactly c from the agents. We first consider the following modified problem; let
where vi is the valuation of agent i with the distribution function Fi. Then Fi is defined
on [O, b - c] . Let (p, x ) be the same mechanism given in Theorem 3 except that agent i's
distribution is Fi instead of Fi for each i.
Define the new mechanism (p, x) as follows;
1. 
p,(v)= { � 
otherwise
n. the planner keeps the object if vk < c for all k,
m. the planner collects c from the winner if there is any winner, and
IV. 
if Vi < C 
where w = (w1, ... ,wn ) and Wj = max{vj - c, O}\lj.
5 Corollary For c 2: 0, the mechanism above is Bayesian incentive compatible, ex-post
efficient, ex-post individually rational, and transfer balanced. 
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We finish with a couple of comments comparing our results to others. 
4.4 Remark Compared to the Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) finding of the im­
possibility of an ex-post efficient, individually rational, trading mechanism between a seller 
who initially owns the object and a buyer, our possibility result relies on the fact that the 
property right to the object is not given to one of the agents but to the outside planner. 
Therefore, it is easier for individual rationality to be satisfied in our framework. This im­
plies that, contrary to the Coase theorem, achieving an efficient outcome heavily depends 
on the assignment of the property right in the incomplete information framework. 
One might conjecture that a lottery allocation of the property right followed by an 
after-market or sale by the new owner of the right, might be equivalent to our mechanism. 
But again from Myerson and Satterthwaite {1983) and Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) 
we know that unless the property right happens to go to the highest value agent, first 
best allocations will not be achieved. Thus our mechanism interim dominates not only 
the equal chance lottery mechanism (Theorem 4) but also that mechanism followed by an
after-market since the property right creates a monopoly which the government, in our 
model, does not take advantage of. 
4.5 Remark In public goods economies, it is well known that ex-post efficient, budget
balanced, Bayesian mechanisms cannot always be interim individually rational (see La/­
font and Maskin (1979)). If we interpret the planner's value c in our model as the cost of
producing the object, the situation of allocating a single indivisible private good is drasti­
cally different from that of allocating a public good. Corollary 5 shows that one can design
ex-post efficient, ex-post individually rational, budget balanced Bayesian mechanisms for 
allocating a private good. 
One of the themes in Groves and Ledyard {1987) was that, in classical economies
with a finite number of agents, there is no distinction between private and public goods 
in designing incentive compatible, ex-post efficient, individually rational mechanisms if 
the incentive compatibility concept is either complete information Nash equilibrium or 
dominant strategy equilibrium. Our results show that with a finite number of agents, 
there is a distinction between private and public goods in designing Bayesian incentive 
compatible, ex-post efficient, individually rational mechanisms. 
4.6 Remark There remain at least two interesting open questions. We have not pro­
vided a characterization of all interim incentive efficient mechanisms subject to ex-post 
individual rationality and balanced transfers. (We do provide a characterization for no 
transfers in Theorem 1.) 
We also have not considered the case where agents' valuations are correlated. In the
case of public goods mechanisms with incomplete information, D 'Aspremont, Cremer and
18 
Gerard- Varet ( 1993) identified the conditions under which ex-post efficiency and budget
balance can be achieved under correlation. Those techniques may also apply to private 
goods. 
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